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Articles 
PLURAL VISION:  INTERNATIONAL LAW 
SEEN THROUGH THE VARIED LENSES OF 
DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION 
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗ 
The essays collected in this Issue of the Valparaiso University Law 
Review evolved from papers presented at a conference on “International 
Law in the Domestic Context” held at the Valparaiso University School 
of Law in April 2009.  To some extent, the conference was a response to 
the questions raised by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Medellín v. Texas1 and our collective curiosity about how other states deal 
with tensions between international obligations and overlapping regimes 
of national law. 
In Medellín, the Supreme Court found that Texas was entitled to 
ignore a ruling of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter “ICJ”) in 
the Avena case.2  The Court thus permitted Texas to proceed with the 
execution of a Mexican national who had not been given timely notice of 
his right to consular notification and consultation in violation of the 
United States’s obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations.3  This ruling seemed to be in tension with two iconic 
documents setting out the relationship of international law and domestic 
law in the United States.  First, the Medellín decision is hard to square 
with the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which provides that 
treaties shall be “supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
                                                 
∗ Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.  The Author is grateful to:  Professor 
Penelope Andrews for her assistance in organizing the conference at which the papers 
collected here were originally presented; to the Law School for its institutional support and 
to its staff for their invaluable logistical and organizational support; and to the Law Review 
editors both for their willingness to see the papers through to publication and for their 
efforts in achieving that goal. 
1 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
2 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
3 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. no. 
6820.  See id. Art. 36(1)(b) (providing that, at the request of a foreign national criminal 
defendant, “the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform 
the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State 
is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other 
manner”).  The ICJ found that the U.S. had violated its Article 36 obligations with respect to 
Avena and other Mexican nationals, including Medellín.  See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 71–72, ¶ 
153 (finding, by a vote of fourteen to one, that the United States had violated its obligations 
under Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (hereinafter “VCCR”)). 
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shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”4  In addition, Medellín seems at 
odds with the famous dictum from The Paquete Habana:  “[i]nternational 
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”5 
Although it is tempting to conclude that Medellín was wrongly 
decided, the reality is that our constitutional tradition speaks with many 
voices on the subject of the relationship between domestic and 
international law.  In order to gain a broader perspective on that 
relationship, we invited experts on foreign law to introduce us to the 
way other states attempt to reconcile international commitments and the 
domestic constitutional order. 
Hans Kelsen’s monism offers a nifty solution to the problem of the 
status of international law as domestic law.  Kelsen believed that there 
must be only one law if there is to be law at all and thus that domestic 
law and international law must be part of one normative system.  As 
Kelsen explained in 1934, his “pure theory” of law recognized “that a 
continuous sequence of legal structures, gradually merging into one 
another, leads from the universal legal community of international law, 
encompassing all states, to the legal communities incorporated into the 
state.”6 
Kelsen’s approach to the relation of international law and domestic 
law makes sense.  If domestic law were not subordinated to international 
law but could trump it, states would routinely demand to be excused 
from their international obligations based on superior domestic law.  
Moreover, from Kelsen’s perspective, as a factual matter, international 
law is higher law than domestic law, because it is only by virtue of the 
recognition of state governments, as a matter of international law, that 
domestic law preserves its monopoly on the domestic use of force.7  The 
internationally recognized legitimacy of state government is what gives 
that government’s regulations the force of law rather than of naked 
power. 
There is, however, a practical impediment to Kelsen’s monism.  Even 
in a monist world, there must be a legal process whereby international 
law is operationalized as a part of domestic law.  Even if we accept that 
                                                 
4 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
5 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
6 HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 124 (Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson, trans. 1992). 
7 See id. at 120 (contending that a state only has lawmaking authority because 
international law empowers states to make law). 
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international law is supreme law and should take precedence over any 
contrary domestic law, there must still be a mechanism assuring that 
supremacy.  As Kelsen acknowledges, state law does not cease to be 
valid law just because it contradicts international law until some 
adjudicatory body strikes down or refuses to enforce the state law to the 
extent of its inconsistency with the state’s international obligations.8  
And so, even from a monist perspective, we need a mechanism for 
securing the orderly implementation of international law in the domestic 
order. 
But the monist perspective is not the only perspective.  In 
Commonwealth countries, for example, the dualist approach prevails.9  
International law is not a part of the domestic legal order unless 
implemented through national legislation.  It is clear from the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution that the Framers intended to 
break with the Commonwealth approach.  Having experienced the 
inconveniences and embarrassments associated with having the 
governments of the Colonies ignore the international obligations of the 
national government under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers 
made treaties Supreme Law of the Land and specified that treaty law 
would trump state law and that state courts must give effect to U.S. 
treaty commitments.10  Customary international law has likewise been 
regarded as “a part of our law” since at least The Paquete Habana, but in 
the post-Erie world, as Gwynne Skinner explores in her contribution to 
this Issue,11 it is very difficult to identify exactly what part of our law it 
is.12 
                                                 
8 See id. at 118 (noting that even an unconstitutional statute remains a valid statute until 
overturned by a legal act). 
9 See Dianne Otto, Protecting Human Rights and Countering Terrorism:  Australia’s 
Contradictory Approaches to Implementing Its International Legal Obligations, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 
911 (2010) (noting that that Australia has adopted a dualist approach); Gib van Ert, Dubious 
Dualism:  The Reception of International Law in Canada, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 927 (2010) (noting 
that because English law does not repose law-making authority in the King, treaties can 
only become domestic law through a legislative act). 
10 See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín & Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377, 414–16 (2009) 
(reviewing statements of the Framers regarding the purpose of the Supremacy Clause). 
11 See Gwynne Skinner, Customary International Law, Federal Common Law and Federal 
Court Jurisdiction, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 825, 835 (2010). 
12 See Curtis Bradley, et al., Sosa, Customary International Law and the Continuing Relevance 
of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (2007) (arguing that after Erie, courts can implement 
rules of customary international law “only in accordance with the requirements and 
limitations of post-Erie federal common law”); Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
815, 821 (1997) (criticizing what they characterize as the “recent ascendancy” of customary 
international law as federal common law).  The Supreme Court of the United States refused 
to adopt this critique of the modern position.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
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While our constitutional design looks remarkably monist, that 
design is counterbalanced by the judicially-created doctrine of self-
execution, according to which treaties are only automatically a part of 
domestic law when they do not contemplate the need for legislative 
enactment.13  The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín clearly rejects 
any presumption that treaties are self-executing.  On one reading of 
Medellín, treaties that have domestic ramifications require congressional 
implementing legislation, unless they make clear on their face the 
parties’ intentions that they be non-self-executing.14 
This doctrine of non-self-executing treaties may well be inconsistent 
with the plain, textual meaning of the Supremacy Clause, and with the 
express views of the Framers regarding the purpose of the Supremacy 
Clause.  However, the monist view may be inconsistent with other 
aspects of the constitutional design.  As others have pointed out, our 
Constitution reposes the legislative power in Congress.15  Permitting 
legislation by treaty would bypass the House of Representatives, which 
seems inconsistent with the constitutional design.16  Moreover, since bills 
that raise revenue must originate in the House of Representatives,17 it is 
                                                                                                             
729 (ruling that Erie does not prevent federal courts from recognizing substantive rules 
arising out of customary international law).  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, 
dissented, endorsing Bradley and Goldsmith’s position.  See id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(maintaining that federal courts have no power to recognize causes of action arising under 
customary international law). 
13 See United States v. Perchemen, 32 U.S. 51, 88–89 (1833) (finding a treaty self-executing 
where it did not stipulate to the need for some future legislative act). 
14 See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (requiring stipulations in the treaty 
itself that its provisions require no legislative enactment).  See also David J. Bederman, 
Medellín's New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 529 (2008) (noting 
that scholarly attention regarding the Medellín opinion had focused on “the Court’s 
supposed ruling as to the presumptive non-self-execution of international agreements 
entered into by the United States”); Julian G. Ku, Medellín's Clear Statement Rule:  A 
Solution for International Delegations, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 615 (2008) (acknowledging 
that Medellín might well be criticized for “departing from existing understandings of the 
non-self-execution doctrine and imposing a new clear statement requirement”); Carlos 
Manuel Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 570 (2008) (noting several 
statements in the majority opinion suggesting that treaties are presumptively non-self-
executing).  But see Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 541 (2008) (suggesting that Medellín is best understood as requiring a 
treaty-by-treaty approach to the question of self-execution without resort to a general 
presumption). 
15 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers “in a Congress of the United 
States”). 
16 See JOHN YOO, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE:  THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AFTER 9/11 215–49 (2005) (arguing that the constitutional design calls for the President to 
take the lead in formulating foreign policy, but vests domestic lawmaking power in 
Congress). 
17 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
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hard to see how a self-executing treaty that required expenditures could 
in fact be implemented without the support of both Houses of Congress.  
Similarly, if the United States were to sign on to an international 
agreement that created new international crimes, given the post-Erie 
absence of general federal common law, such crimes could not become 
part of our domestic law without some sort of legislative enactment. 
Despite the monist overtones of the Supremacy Clause, as a product 
of our constitutional history, the United States has a strong dualist 
tradition as well.  This tradition has recently been embodied in a school 
of thought that I will call “sovereigntist,” because its proponents regard 
state sovereignty as the fountainhead from which all law must derive.18  
Soveigntism, of very different types, is represented in this Issue, in the 
contributions of Robert Blomquist19 and Richard Stith.20  For Professor 
Blomquist, international law poses a threat to the exercise of executive 
authority to conduct U.S. foreign affairs, an authority that he believes 
resides uniquely in the President.21  Professor Stith is an unusual type of 
sovereigntist, in that he is not particularly interested in the protection of 
U.S. sovereignty.  His sympathies lie more with weaker states whose 
unique and diverse legal, social, and cultural norms are in danger of 
                                                 
18 See Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism:  Missouri and Holland, 73 
MO. L. REV. 1105, 1113–14 (2008) (defining sovereigntism as “a position insistent on a 
nation’s right to define and delineate its own lawmaking”); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and 
the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 654 & n.16 (2002) (characterizing 
sovereigntism as “grounded in a general skepticism of international law and international 
lawmaking processes”).  Leading sovereigntists include academics such as Jeremy Rabkin, 
Curtis Bradley, and Julian Ku, government officials such as John Bolton, and people who 
have served as both scholars and government officials, such as John Yoo and Jack 
Goldsmith.  Examples of scholarship espousing a sovereigntist position include JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); JEREMY RABKIN, 
LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? (2005); JEREMY RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2004); JEREMY 
RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS (1998); YOO, supra note 16; Curtis A. Bradley, 
International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1557 (2003); John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
205 (2000); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:  New 
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000).  As Julian Ku points out, at least 
some sovereigntists object to the label.  See Julian Ku, Treaties as Laws:  A Defense of the Last-
in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L. J. 319, 342 n. 121 (2005) (contending 
that people characterized as “[s]overeigntists” are more interested in a  critique of the 
“internationalist” conception of international law than in developing a pro-sovereignty 
ideology). 
19 Robert Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security Presiprudence, 44 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 881 (2010). 
20 Richard Stith, If Dorothy Hadn’t Had Toto to Pull Back the Wizard’s Curtain:  The 
Fabrication of Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 847 (2010). 
21 See Blomquist, supra note 19, at 888 (arguing that courts should grant the President 
“wide latitude” in reconciling national security and liberty). 
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being subsumed within the homogeneity of the new “world religion,” 
international human rights law.22 
Initially it seems, supporters of national sovereignty and 
independence should have no strong objection to the supremacy of 
international law, since international law is based on consent, at least in 
theory.23  In reality, there are elements of international law that do not 
conform to the theory, including jus cogens norms,24 customary norms 
when applied to new states that did not exist at the time of the norms’ 
formation,25 and new international criminal tribunals that could exercise 
jurisdiction over the nationals of states that have not consented to such 
jurisdiction.26  As Professor Stith’s paper highlights, international norms 
and institutions sometimes purport to be law whether or not they are 
endowed with the indicia of legitimacy identified by Thomas Franck—
right process and substantive fairness.27  Moreover, they might exercise 
an imbalanced compliance pull28 on states powerless to resist the 
powerful states that stand behind international legal norms (and 
international economic assistance programs) while permitting 
themselves to ignore such norms when they prove inconvenient.29 
Given the tensions in our constitutional design, it is not surprising 
that the domestic implementation of international obligations gives rise 
to certain difficulties.  However, as the papers in this Issue indicate, in its 
                                                 
22 See Stith, supra note 20, at 850 (characterizing international human rights law as a new 
world religion in which forces of international domination are met on the domestic side—
at least in weaker states only by forces of surrender); id. (sympathetically citing a 
newspaper ad denouncing the World Trade Organization for working to “undermine the 
constitutional rights of sovereign nations”). 
23 See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 
141 (2005) (“It is commonly observed that international law cannot bind states without 
their consent, and notions of consent are often said to be the basis for [customary 
international law].”). 
24 See Laurence R. Hilfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 
89 (2008) (noting that when international adjudicatory bodies recognize the peremptory 
status of legal norms, they do not require evidence of state consent before finding states 
bound). 
25 Guzman, supra note 23, at 172–74 (offering a rational choice model to permit new 
states to object to customary international law rules at the time of the states’ formation). 
26 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12 (1998), 37 ILM 999. 
27 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 7–8 (1996) 
(arguing that the legitimacy of legal rules turns on the processes through which they are 
adopted and on the rules’ substantive fairness from the perspective of distributive justice). 
28 “[C]ompliance pull” is Thomas Franck’s name for the “inherent pull power” toward 
compliance that legal norms exercise and which Franck views as an “index of legitimacy.”  
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 712 (1998). 
29 See Stith, supra note 20, at 847–48 (contrasting U.S. dualism and superpower status 
that preserves a democratic choice that is unavailable in countries such as Argentina and 
Mexico where international law is directly effective and supreme). 
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struggles with this particular legal and conceptual difficulty, the United 
States is, for once, anything but exceptional.  Nonetheless, there are 
aspects of the law of the United States that are at least idiosyncratic.  This 
Issue sheds new light on those idiosyncrasies while also exploring the 
difficulties of reconciling international obligations and the domestic legal 
order. 
The essays collected here were presented in three separate panels 
during the conference.  The organization of the volume follows the same 
organizational principle.  The first three papers thus focus on questions 
relating to the implementation of international human rights as domestic 
law.  The two papers that follow address issues relating to international 
obligations and national security law.  The final section, which comprises 
four papers, provides a comparative perspective on how international 
law is introduced into the domestic legal systems of Australia, Canada, 
China, and the United Kingdom. 
* 
*            * 
The first three papers address the difficulties that the United States 
and other countries face in the implementation of human rights law as 
domestic law.  One hurdle to U.S. participation in international legal 
regimes is our federalism, because as Medellín illustrates, the federal 
government cannot always compel the states to abide by international 
obligations taken on by the federal government.30  Paul Finkelman’s 
paper reminds us that in the ante-bellum period, “American states 
treated each other as ‘foreign entities’” and “often refused to recognize 
and give comity to the laws of other states.”31  Moreover, Professor 
Finkelman cites to both the Alien Tort Statute32 and to the frequent 
citation to foreign law in early U.S. cases as evidence that international 
and foreign law have always been a part of our law.33 
But Professor Finkelman’s more surprising argument is that in the 
ante-bellum period, the several states regarded the laws of other U.S. 
states no differently from the way they regarded the law of foreign 
                                                 
30 See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (finding that because none of the 
treaties at issue in Medellín create binding federal law in the absence of implementing 
legislation and that no such legislation exists and that decisions by the International Court 
of Justice do not create binding federal law that could overcome the state bar to successive 
habeas petitions, Texas may proceed with the execution of Medellín notwithstanding the 
fact that such an execution would place the United States in violation of its international 
obligations). 
31 Paul Finkelman, When International Law Was a Domestic Problem, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 779 
(2010). 
32 28 U.S.C.  § 1350 (2006). 
33 Finkelman, supra note 31, at 779–80. 
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states.  In that context, the Supreme Court of the United States often 
resorted to international law concepts to settle conflicts among states or 
between citizens of separate states.34  Professor Finkelman’s contribution 
also illustrates how race was often at the center of the development of 
U.S. doctrines relating to inter-state comity and choice of law. 
The United States’ unique Alien Tort Statute is another ingredient of 
U.S. law that renders idiosyncratic the U.S approach to the problem of 
international law as a part of the domestic order.  The Alien Tort Statute 
has been at the center of litigation that has attempted—through the 
disorderly and ad hoc process that is the stuff of common law 
adjudication—to specify the status of customary international law within 
our domestic legal order.35  As Professor Skinner points out, scholars are 
divided into two camps—the modernist and revisionist positions—on 
the issue.36 
Professor Skinner intervenes forcefully in this debate with an essay 
that consults eighteenth and nineteenth century sources of law.  
Pinpointing the status of customary international law turns out to be a 
difficult task because, although the Supreme Court has stated that U.S. 
law “recognized” what then was called the “law of nations” at the time 
of the Founding,37 it was not recognized as part of general federal 
common law at the time because that body of law did not emerge until 
later in the nineteenth century.38  While Professor Skinner notes that 
there are strong arguments on both sides of the academic debate 
regarding whether customary international law was part of the law of 
the United States for the purposes of Article III of the Constitution, she 
concludes that the contemporary disagreement reflects similar 
disagreements that raged throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  In fact, she argues that the debate over the status of customary 
international law was a product of larger debates regarding the 
                                                 
34 Id. at 783–84. 
35 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (addressing Alien Tort Statute 
claim brought by a Mexican national alleging unlawful detention in Mexico by a Mexican 
national); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting an 
Alien Tort Statute claim by survivors of a terror attack perpetrated by foreign nationals in 
Israel); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing Alien Tort Statute 
claim brought by a Paraguayan national whose brother had been tortured and killed by 
Paraguayan police). 
36 See Skinner, supra note 11, at 829–30 (identifying modernists as those who believe that 
federal law incorporates customary international law either in whole or in part and 
revisionists as those who believe that, post-Erie, federal incorporation of custom requires a 
legislative act). 
37 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
38 Skinner, supra note 11, at 832. 
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relationship of the federal government and the states within our federal 
system.39 
Professor Skinner nonetheless argues that customary international 
law, or at least some aspects of it, is included in the “‘laws of the United 
States’” for the purposes of creating federal jurisdiction under Article III 
of the U.S. Constitution and that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 also grants federal 
courts jurisdiction over federal common law doctrines that incorporate 
or recognize customary international law.40   She thus navigates a middle 
ground between the modern and revisionist positions on the status of 
customary international law as “part of our law,” arguing that only 
customary rules “recognized” under general federal common law can 
give rise to claims in federal courts.41 
While these first two contributions focus on the domestic 
mechanisms, such as constitutional principles, comity, or the Alien Tort 
Statute, for recognizing international human rights law or humanitarian 
principles as part of our law, Professor Stith’s paper introduces a stirring 
antidote to what might be described as international human rights law 
triumphalism.  Compared with developing nations forced to surrender 
to the new prophets of the new world religion, as Professor Stith 
describes them, the United States is rather well-defended when it comes 
to resisting the universalizing impulses of international law.  Hence, the 
original panel’s concern with how best to implement international 
human rights law in the domestic context evidences an “American 
parochialism.”42  Professor Stith suggests that resistance to universal 
human rights may be a necessary means of preserving a fruitful and 
blessed diversity, not only in the U.S., but globally. 
Professor Stith problematizes the international human rights 
movement on a number of levels, but his most sweeping argument is 
that rights are, by their very nature, anti-democratic.43  But Professor 
Stith’s real concern is with positive rights; that is, rights that the state has 
a positive duty to protect, as opposed to negative rights, which require 
only that the state leave us alone.44  The problems that Professor Stith 
identifies are best represented in General Comment 15 on the right to 
water, which the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
promulgated in 2002.45  Professor Stith characterizes the Committee as a 
                                                 
39 Id. at 833. 
40 Id. at 839–41. 
41 Id. at 844–46. 
42 Stith, supra note 20, at 847. 
43 Id. at 850. 
44 Id. at 856–57. 
45 EC.12/2002/11, 20 Jan. 2003, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ 
a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94/$FILE/G0340229.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
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non-representative body of non-lawyers that has promulgated a 
document that seeks through legal language to bind states to protect a 
positive right to water that is not expressly mentioned in any 
international agreement.  The Committee’s Comment is effective, says 
Professor Stith, not because it is backed up by the threat of force but 
because it is “backed up with guilt and shame for those who refuse to 
comply.”46 For Professor Stith, the oracular quality of the 
pronouncements of international bodies creates dynamics more akin to 
religious than to legal discourse.47 
Professor Stith raises significant and familiar objections relating to 
international law’s notorious “democracy deficit.”48  In considering how 
to address those objections, it is important to note, especially in the 
context of a volume on the domestic implementation of international law 
that those who decry the democracy deficit in international law greatly 
exaggerate the extent to which international law is distinct from 
domestic law in this respect. 
At least within the United States, people regard international law 
with suspicion for the same reason they are wary of (or think they are 
wary of) activist judges.  They think of courts and of international law as 
elite (or at least non-populist), unaccountable because unelected 
(although state courts now are largely elected by people who have no 
idea who they are voting for), and alien.  International law is alien for 
obvious reasons; courts are alien because they use a technical jargon and 
decide cases on grounds other than the merits that are completely 
opaque to the non-lawyer. 
In fact, however, our supposedly democratically accountable 
branches of government are not much more so than are courts.  As far as 
our House of Representatives is concerned (the so-called “People’s 
House”), because of gerrymandering, it is far more accurate to say that 
our politicians choose their constituents than the other way ’round.49  
                                                 
46 Stith, supra note 20, at 857. 
47 Dianne Otto points out that, at least in Australia, international attempts at shaming 
the government into adopting human rights protections through domestic measures have 
fallen on deaf ears.  Otto, supra note 9, at 916. 
48 Stith, supra note 20, at 851 n.10. 
49 See Reelection Rates of Incumbents in the U. S. House By Congress and by State, 
http://www.thirty-thousand.org/documents/QHA-08.pdf (last visited March 20, 2009) 
(finding that rates of return in the House of Representatives easily exceed 90% for members 
who seek re-election); Richard L. Hall, Equalizing Expenditures in Congressional Campaigns: A 
Proposal, 6 ELECTION L.J. 145, 148 (2007) (noting that even in 2006, a year of dramatic party 
reversal, 94% of Senators and House Members who sought re-election won).  On the use of 
political gerrymandering to protect incumbents or to deprive incumbents of their safe seats, 
see generally Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab: When does gerrymandering become a 
threat to democracy?, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2003). 
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And once they have chosen their districts, members of the House have to 
devote much of their two-year terms to securing re-election rather than 
to legislating.50  Things are better in the Senate, but only by degree, not 
by an order of magnitude, and their six-year terms render Senators only 
slightly more accountable than judges.51  Presidents may of course be 
turned out of office, but they are never turned out of office for one bad 
decision in particular, while judges are often vilified for upholding laws 
that passed unnoticed when enacted by a legislature.52  In any case, the 
real power is not in passing legislation but in drafting it, and for the most 
part the people who do so are either unelected and unaccountable 
specialists within the executive branch, unelected and unaccountable 
legislative aids, or unelected and unaccountable lobbyists. 
There is no doubt that international law faces challenges not only of 
democracy deficit but also of transparency.  But here again, international 
institutions are not qualitatively different from national institutions.  
Because of the well-documented tendency of the executive branch to 
expand the scope of classified documents, there has been a huge increase 
in the portion of our executive branch that is completely inaccessible to 
the voting public.53  A much larger portion of it is technically accessible 
but in reality just as hidden because keeping tabs on specialized 
executive agencies is more than a full-time job.  Legislatures are no better 
of course, as they routinely pass important legislation without reading 
                                                 
50 See Peter Francia & Paul Herrnson, The Impact of Public Finance Laws on Fundraising in 
State Legislative Elections, 31 AM. POL. RES. 520, 531 (2003) (finding that Members of 
Congress spend on average 34% of their time in office raising funds for re-election).  
STEVEN S. SMITH, ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 7 (4th ed. 2005) (estimating that the 
average Representative raises $10,000 per week over a two-year term and that the average 
Senator raises $22,000 per week over a six-year term); Thomas M. Susman, Lobbying in the 
21st Century—Reciprocity and the Need for Reform, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 737, 744 (2006) 
(observing that most Members of Congress therefore spend most of their time raising 
money). 
51 Compare Judith Resnik, So Long, LEGAL AFFAIRS 20, 21 (July/August 2005) (finding that 
the average tenure in office for federal judges who have retired in the last two decades has 
been about twenty-four years), with ROGER H. DAVIDSON, ET AL., CONGRESS AND ITS 
MEMBERS (2008) (finding that the average tenure in office for Senators is approaching 
sixteen years). 
52 E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding a law that had 
passed unnoticed when enacted by the legislature). 
53 According to the National Archives’ Information Security Oversight Office, which is 
empowered pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 2001 (2010) to collect yearly statistics on classification 
and declassification of materials from any agency “that creates or handles classified 
information,” the number of classified documents increased from 8.65 million in 2001 to 
23.1 million in 2007.  See Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets:  The Role Courts Should Play in 
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (2006) (noting that 
government officials frequently admit that far more material is declared “classified” than is 
really necessary for national security purposes). 
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it.54  This is inevitably true because of the sheer length of omnibus 
legislation and because of the byzantine amendment process that 
inevitably causes bills to morph and grow on their way to adoption. 
Compared with our domestic political institutions international 
bodies may have a tremendous discursive advantage. Their deliberations 
may be private, at least in part, but there is always significant 
opportunity for public comment and criticism, and the reasoning 
underlying statements of international adjudicatory or treaty bodies, 
warts and all, is presented in public documents that are subject to 
criticism and resistance. 
Thus, expanding on Professor Stith’s critique of rights and of 
international human rights, we might pose the same sorts of questions 
with respect to the domestic legal order.  Domestic courts might very 
well view the Alien Tort Statute, that “legal Lohengrin”55 with the same 
sort of suspicion which we ordinarily reserve for foreign and 
international law.  While we are at it, we can look at other domestic 
institutions that touch on human rights and that are neither 
constitutional nor democratic in nature, such as: Presidential signing 
statements, which can gut legislation seeking to force the executive to 
abide by international human rights instruments; the Totten doctrine and 
the state secrets privilege, which can shield the executive from liability 
even for constitutional violations provable through publicly-available 
evidence; sole executive and legislative-executive agreements, which 
account for over 90% of the United States’ international agreements and 
skirt the Senate’s constitutional treaty powers; and the reservations, 
understandings, and declarations that the Senate attaches to the rare 
treaty submitted for its advice and consent. 
* 
*            * 
Our second set of essays address foreign affairs and national security 
concerns, and there we begin with a return to the subject of federalism, 
as explored in Michael Granne’s essay.56  One of the interesting oddities 
of the Medellín case, to which I alluded earlier, is that it could be read as 
requiring the acquiescence of the federal government, represented 
strenuously by the executive branch, in a foreign policy decision made 
                                                 
54 See Ittai Bar-Siman Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?:  Rethinking the 
‘Enrolled Bill’ Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323, 338–39 (2009) (reporting that ominbus legislation is 
“often passed by Congress via all-night sessions under tight deadlines, without any notice 
or time for members to read or understand them”). 
55 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (calling the Alien Tort Statute 
a legal Lohengrin because nobody knows “whence it came”). 
56 Michael Aaron Granne, Two-Dimensional Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption, 44 
VAL. U. L. REV. 863 (2010). 
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by a state court in Texas.57  Professor Granne notes that Medellín is just 
one in a long line of cases in which the courts have wrestled with the 
question of foreign affairs preemption.  In Professor Granne’s view, the 
courts have not articulated a principled approach to preemption in this 
area and the resulting case law does not appear to be internally 
consistent. 
Professor Granne argues that courts’ approaches have seemed 
incoherent because courts fail to adequately appreciate that conflicts 
between state and federal interests in foreign affairs can be understood 
as inhabiting three different paradigms, each of which requires a 
different approach to the weighing of the state and federal interests 
implicated. The first paradigm, for which Zschernig v. Miller58 is 
emblematic, is often called “dormant foreign affairs preemption,” in 
which federal law automatically displaces any state law that interferes 
with foreign affairs powers entrusted to the federal government alone.59  
Second, we have what Professor Granne calls “obstacle preemption.”  
This arises when state action presents an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of congressional goals.  The emblematic cases illustrating this paradigm 
are Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,60 in which the Supreme Court 
struck down a Massachusetts law that was at odds with congressional 
sanctions against the state of Burma (Myanmar), and American Insurance 
Association v. Garamendi,61 in which the Supreme Court struck down 
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act.62  Finally, there may 
be cases where a congressional statement of intent to preempt state law 
could be required.63 
Professor Granne applies recent scholarship differentiating between 
vertical and horizontal federalism in order to provide a more coherent 
basis for foreign affairs preemption. Vertical federalism describes 
situations when federal uniformity concerns justify permitting federal 
law to trump state law.  Horizontal federalism describes situations in 
which there is a need to coordinate state activities, as in the area of 
environmental protection.  While foreign affairs might seem like a classic 
case for vertical federalism, Professor Granne argues that elements of 
                                                 
57 Telman, supra note 10, at 385 (noting that the Medellín majority permitted a state court 
in Texas to determine U.S. foreign policy over the strong objections of the executive 
branch). 
58 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
59 Granne, supra note 56, at 866. 
60 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
61 537 U.S. 1100 (2003). 
62 Granne, supra note 56, at 868. 
63 Id. at 868–69. 
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horizontal federalism also ought to inform our foreign affairs 
preemption doctrine.64 
Some state actions implicate foreign affairs but do not create any 
significant tensions with federal control of foreign affairs.  Examples of 
such state actions include cultural and educational exchanges and trade 
agreements between individual states and foreign nations.  With respect 
to this category, Professor Granne’s model would require federal 
preemption only when specifically called for by federal statute or 
treaty.65  The second category is state policies, such as “Buy American 
Statutes,” which give rise to non-trivial interference with federal 
uniformity concerns in the area of free trade.  Here, Professor Granne 
argues, the obstacle preemption approach is appropriate.66  Finally, there 
are state statutes that single out some foreign government for sanction.  
These statutes implicate both the uniformity concerns associated with 
vertical federalism and the coordination problems associated with 
horizontal federalism.  To such cases, Professor Granne argues, the 
dormant foreign affairs preemption approach is best suited.67  Professor 
Granne’s paper thus offers an elegant solution that makes sense of a 
confusing tangle of related cases. 
The thread that unites our two papers that address national security 
issues is the question of the role of courts in adjudicating disputes 
relating to foreign affairs.  While Professor Granne develops a nuanced 
preemption doctrine that recognizes the competing interests of the 
several states and the branches of the federal government, Professor 
Blomquist focuses on the institutional competence of the executive 
branch and thus argues for judicial deference to the foreign affairs 
powers of the President, whom he characterizes as “the national security 
sentinel with vast, but not unlimited, powers to protect the Nation from 
hostile, potentially catastrophic, threats.”68  Because of the President’s 
vastly superior store of knowledge and expertise, Professor Blomquist 
argues that courts should not question executive national security 
decisions “unless clearly necessary to counterbalance an indubitable 
violation of the text of the Constitution.”69  Professor Blomquist also 
stakes out a position against the use of foreign law as legal precedent, 
especially when a U.S. court is reviewing the executive’s determinations 
                                                 
64 Id. at 869. 
65 Id. at 876–80. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Blomquist, supra note 19, at 885. 
69 Id.  
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relating to national security, a field for which Professor Blomquist has 
created a handy term, “presiprudence.”70 
Professor Blomquist’s position, opposing the use of foreign law, is 
uncontroversial, and in fact Professor Blomquist cites to no case in which 
a U.S. court has ever relied on foreign law as precedent.71  The 
consequences of his position on presiprudence with respect to 
international law are, by contrast, potentially explosive.  For example, 
Professor Blomquist follows Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, who 
argue that the United States should only abide by its international 
obligations under the laws of war when the U.S. benefits from such 
compliance, taking into account the possible reputational costs of non-
compliance.72  This position clearly informed the Department of Justice 
during the George W. Bush administration, but it was rejected by that 
administration’s Department of State.73  This conflict between two 
agencies within the same executive branch complicates the logic of 
presiprudence and also, as I have argued elsewhere,74 renders dubious 
the executive branch’s claims to superior expertise in matters of foreign 
affairs.  If the President chooses the opinions of his highly politicized and 
in part non-expert Office of Legal Counsel over those of his highly 
professionalized legal advisors within the Department of State on 
matters of international law, the executive branch must abandon its 
argument that courts should defer to the executive branch’s superior 
expertise. 
* 
*            * 
Our final set of papers introduces us to the dynamic regarding the 
implementation of international law as domestic law in Australia, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and China.  In those countries, as here, the 
                                                 
70 Robert F. Blomquist, American National Security Presiprudence, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
439 (2008). 
71 See Blomquist, supra note 19, at 892 n.55 (citing only a hypothetical reliance by federal 
judges on foreign law as precedent). 
72 Id. at 889. 
73 Compare John C. Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, 
11–42 (Jan. 9, 2002) (arguing that the President is not bound either by treaty law or by 
customary international law with respect to the conduct of the War on Terror in 
Afghanistan), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020109.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009), with William H. Taft IV, Memorandum to John C. Yoo, 1 (Jan. 11, 
2002) (arguing that “[i]nternal law does not support key conclusions” in the 
Yoo/Delahunty memorandum). 
74 See D. A. Jeremy Telman, The Foreign Affairs Power: Does the Constitution Matter? 80 
TEMP. L. REV. 245, 277–78 (2007) (pointing out that the same argument, made by John Yoo, 
is hard to square with Yoo’s career in the Justice Department, in which he frequently and 
successfully persuaded the White House to ignore expert advice coming from the 
Department of State). 
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picture is more complicated than the simple choice of monism or 
dualism might suggest.  But these cases contain insights into foreign 
practices that provide useful perspectives on our own.  For example, the 
first contribution in this final set of four, from Jim Kennan,75 includes a 
discussion of judicial views of deference to the executive branch in 
national security cases, that provides a startling contrast to the position 
set out in Professor Blomquist’s essay. 
Mr. Kennan’s discussion of the case law from the United Kingdom 
culminates with some excerpts on the subject of deference to executive 
authority from the Belmarsh case, which was decided in the House of 
Lords in 2004.76  In rejecting sweeping claims to executive expertise in 
national security matters, the Law Lords referenced the skepticism 
“which has attached to intelligence assessments since the fiasco over 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,” and suggested that such faulty 
assessments were to blame for the participation of the military forces of 
the United Kingdom in Iraq.77  They also declared that terrorism, while 
“hideous” and “serious,” does not pose an existential threat.  Rather, the 
threat arises from our own responses to terror.78  Indian courts echo this 
view that courts must protect human rights even in times of national 
crisis.79  The Kantian dictum, fiat justicia ruat caelum, seems to have 
retained much of its original force. 
Turning to his native Australia, Jim Kennan notes that Australia has 
no constitutional protections of individual rights akin to our Bill of 
Rights, nor does it automatically incorporate international human rights 
obligations into domestic law.  Rather, Australia seems to have a canon 
of interpretation much like our own, that statutes should be construed to 
be consistent with international obligations absent a clear statement to 
the contrary.80  But unlike the United Kingdom, Australia is reluctant to 
address human rights concerns on any basis other than the common 
law.81  Mr. Kennan’s conclusion is clear:  the English approach is 
preferable.82  But his essay holds out hope for human rights in Australia.  
It is to be found not in the common law, nor in the customary law of 
                                                 
75 Jim Kennan, The Role of International Human Rights Law in Australian Law, 44 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 895 (2010). 
76 Id. at 903–07. 
77 Id. at 906. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 907. 
80 Id. at 895–96; see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if 
any other possible construction remains . . . .”). 
81 Kennan, supra note 75, at 896–903. 
82 Id. at 908–09. 
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nations but in the common sense of Australian jurors willing “to stand 
back from the war on terror rhetoric which has so dominated public 
discussion since 2001.”83 
Dianne Otto’s piece picks up where Jim Kennan’s left off, 
acknowledging Australia’s insistence on protecting human rights only 
through domestic enactments.  But she then picks up on some of the 
themes of Richard Stith’s paper, although in a completely different 
register, expressing concern that Security Council resolutions aimed at 
countering international terrorism might give rise to a new hegemonic 
international law.84  Professor Otto tells what for U.S. lawyers is a fairly 
familiar narrative in which national pride in one’s own domestic 
protections of civil rights, coupled with distrust of judicial processes 
forms the basis for opposition to the implementation of international 
treaty obligations.85  In fact, Professor Otto suggests that the response of 
the conservative Howard government to criticisms of its human rights 
record was “reminiscent of the United States’ exceptionalist claims.”86 
However, Professor Otto notes the contrast between Australia’s 
reluctance to implement international human rights protections and its 
“eagerness to implement its international legal obligations” relating to 
post-9/11 Security Council resolutions, especially Resolution 1373.87  
This resolution was remarkable for the swiftness with which it was 
adopted and for its sweeping nature.  Unlike previous Security Council 
resolutions, Resolution 1373 does not call for temporary measures 
addressing a specific threat to international peace and security.  
Unfortunately, despite its legislative quality, Resolution 1373 bears “the 
opaqueness and exclusivity” that are the hallmark of executive 
enactments and of the Security Council’s protocols more generally.88  
Pursuant to Resolution 1373, Australia enacted legislation creating 
enhanced police and surveillance powers modeled on the USA Patriot 
Act of 2001.89  This is international law-making at its most muscular, and 
it is undertaken by a body that Professor Otto describes as “patently 
unrepresentative, un-consultative, and lacking in transparency and 
accountability.”90 
Despite her disappointment with Australia’s record on human rights 
and its willingness to toe the line when it comes to Security Council 
                                                 
83 Id. at 909. 
84 Otto, supra note 9, at 911–12. 
85 Id. at 912–13. 
86 Id. at 916. 
87 Id. at 919.   
88 Id. at 920. 
89 Id. at 923. 
90 Id.  
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directives on national security issues, Professor Otto concludes by 
stressing the need for all states to recognize the universality of human 
rights.91  The problem is not that international law is brought into the 
domestic process but that this occurs through hegemonic law rather than 
through what she calls the “participatory international law-making 
processes” involving both states and civil society.92 
Gib van Ert’s contribution to this Issue begins with a simple 
syllogism:  under Canadian law, only the executive can make treaties 
and the executive cannot make law; therefore, treaties are not law.93  In 
principle, Canadian law does not suffer from the ambiguities that led to 
the Medellín case:  all treaties require legislative implementation in order 
to be part of the Canadian domestic legal order.94  But Canada is not a 
pure dualist system; it too is a hybrid in which customary international 
law is directly incorporated into common law and in which judicial 
interpretation can give direct effect to treaties as well.95  In addition, in 
developing and interpreting domestic human rights norms, Canadian 
attorneys and courts are free to refer to—and even to rely on—legal 
norms that arise in foreign and international contexts.96  Moreover, 
Canadian courts would appear to be even less deferential to executive 
interpretations of international and treaty law than are their counterparts 
in the United Kingdom.97 
Mr. van Ert’s discussion of Canada’s incorporation doctrine, 
whereby rules of customary international law are directly incorporated 
into domestic law, is especially instructive.  Based on the academic 
uproar about the modernist and revisionist positions discussed above,98 
one would think that opportunities to give direct effect to international 
custom arise all the time.  As Mr. van Ert notes, they almost never arise, 
because:  (1) customary rules generally govern state behavior and thus 
rarely have relevance to domestic legal issues; and (2) it is very difficult 
to prove that a rule of custom exists.99  Were it not for the Alien Tort 
Statute, U.S. courts likely would have little reason to ponder the status of 
customary international law as part of our law. 
Equally instructive is Mr. van Ert’s discussion of the Canadian 
approach to treaties.  Because Canadian courts presume that legislation 
                                                 
91 Id. at 924. 
92 Id. at 925. 
93 van Ert, supra note 9, at 927. 
94 Id. at 927–28. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 929. 
97 Id. at 930. 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 35–41. 
99 van Ert, supra note 9, at 931. 
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was intended to conform to Canada’s international obligations, absent 
evidence of “unequivocal legislative intent to default,” statutes are 
interpreted with the aid of treaty law.100  As a result, despite its 
seemingly pure dualism, Canada arrives at a position not unlike that of 
the United States’ “last in time” doctrine, in which subsequent legislation 
trumps treaty obligations only if the two cannot be reconciled.  A statute 
is thus interpreted so as to place the United States in violation of its 
treaty obligations only if Congress, in enacting the statute, expressed its 
clear and unequivocal desire to do so.101 
In the final essay in our collection, Zou Keyuan provides a sweeping 
history of the status of international law in China, the only non-common-
law country addressed in this Issue.102  Of the countries surveyed, China 
seems to be closest to the monist model, since Chinese law provides that 
China’s international obligations supersede any contrary domestic 
law.103  However, Chinese scholars view the Chinese approach as a 
modified form of dualism, which acknowledges the separate existence of 
the two types of law and does not establish a hierarchical relationship 
between them.104  Regardless how one characterizes the Chinese 
approach on a theoretical level, Chinese practice, as described by 
Professor Zou, is exemplary.  When China takes on a new international 
obligation, it implements that obligation through legislation, and it alters 
existing laws and regulations to bring domestic law into conformity with 
the new international standard.105  And, as do courts in the U.S. and 
Canada, Chinese courts interpret statutes wherever possible so as to 
reconcile domestic and international law.106 
However, when it comes to the implementation of human rights 
norms, China’s practice is less exemplary.  Professor Zou’s extended 
discussion of the Chinese practice of re-education through labor 
(hereinafter “RTL”) illustrates one area in which China’s domestic 
policies are not in conformity with international standards.  China’s RTL 
policies do not place it in violation of any treaties that it has ratified, but 
they are inconsistent, says Professor Zou, with China’s having signed 
                                                 
100 van Ert, supra note 9,  at 932. 
101 See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(finding that courts are “under a duty to interpret statutes in a manner consonant with 
existing treaty obligations,” unless Congress had “clearly and unequivocally exercised” its 
power to abrogate the United States’s international obligations). 
102 Zou Keyuan, International Law in the Chinese Domestic Context, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 935 
(2010). 
103 See id. at 938 (noting that under China’s Civil Law, if China ratifies a treaty that is 
inconsistent with domestic law, the international legal rules govern). 
104 Id. at 937–38. 
105 Id. at 937–39. 
106 Id. at 938–40. 
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(but not yet ratified) the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and with non-binding human rights declarations to which China 
is a party.107 
The role of courts in implementing international law in the domestic 
context in China is equally unclear.  Professor Zou reports that they have 
had occasion to do so only rarely and their practice has been 
inconsistent.  While some courts have applied international law in 
certain commercial and maritime contexts, there is some authority for 
the position that international human rights treaties may not be given 
direct effect under Chinese law.108 
* 
*            * 
 I began this introductory essay with a discussion of the monist and 
dualist approaches to the question of the incorporation of international 
law as domestic law.  In this area, as in so many areas, the Holmesian 
dictum applies:  the life of the law has been not logic but experience.109  
Programmatic statements in founding documents or in law review 
articles will not determine the status of international law in the domestic 
context.  It is to be worked out through the various legal histories of each 
state.  As each state grapples to reconcile its national legal traditions with 
its international obligations, it is worthwhile to pause and consider the 
experiences of others.  It is our hope that this Issue contributes to that 
process. 
                                                 
107 Id. at 946–50. 
108 Id. at 950–56. 
109 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not 
been logic: it has been experience.”). 
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